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Abstract  
 
This contribution aims at highlighting the complex, non-linear and potentially 
contradictory nature of the relationships between technological progress, economic growth 
and social development, in particular within the context of market based economies. The 
main (provocative) argument put forward in the paper is that the recent neo-Schumpeterian 
literature, while providing fundamental contributions to our understanding of innovation, 
has contributed to the rising of a positivistic reading of the relationship between 
technology, economy and society, with technology being able to guaranty strong economic 
growth and (implicitly) social welfare. This is confirmed by the fact that, contrary to other 
influential heterodox economic schools and Schumpeter himself, in the recent neo-
Schumpeterian literature technology is only rarely associated to macroeconomic market 
failures such as systemic crises, structural unemployment, and the growth of social and 
economic inequalities. It is also argued that the emergence of a “positivistic bias” in the 
neo-Schumpeterian literature has been associated to the dominance of a supply-side and 
micro-based view of the technology-economy relationships. 
 
Key words: Technology, Innovation, Schumpeter, Development, Crisis 
JEL codes: B52, O00, O30.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is no doubt that the last economic crisis, with its depth, extension and length, could 
have, at least in principle, the potentiality of shaking at the fundamentals the dominant 
neo-liberal economic thinking and policy framework. One could even not rule out the 
possibility that, as in the 30s the “great depression” paved the way to the “Keynesian 
revolution”, in the next years or decades a somewhat similar earthquake in economic 
theory and policy framework might take place (Bellofiore and Halevi, 2011). Whatever 
will happen in the next future to the economic discipline and policy practice, there is no 
doubt that the “systemic” nature of the last economic crisis, and its enormous social costs, 
challenge de facto all theoretical approaches that have magnified the economic and social 
welfare virtues of un-regulated market economies, downplayed the relevance of structural 
macro-economic market failures, expelled the “crisis issue” from the economic research 
agenda (Brancaccio and Fontana, 2011). 
 
In this contribution we argue that the last economic crisis challenges also the widespread 
(both within and outside orthodox economics) positivistic view on the role technology 
plays in our economies and societies (Soete, 2013). More specifically, the somewhat 
provocative argument put forward in this paper is that such a positivistic stand permeates 
also the neo-Schumpeterian literature, that is that broad stream of research originated in 
the 70s and 80s having as its main research focus the nature, the determinants and the 
economic effects of technological change and innovation. Despite being constituted by a 
rather heterogeneous set of research streams (Fageberg, 2013a; Winter, 2014), all in all 
this body of literature tends to convey an optimistic scenario of the economic and social 
effects of technology, with technology being able to guaranty strong economic and 
employment growth and (implicitly) social welfare. As it will be argued in the following 
sections this positivistic view on the dynamic and socially progressive virtues that 
technology plays in capitalist economies is confirmed by the fact that, contrary to classical 
economists, and Schumpeter himself, in the neo-Schumpeterian literature technology is 
only rarely associated to macroeconomic market failures such as systemic crises, 
structural unemployment, and the growth of social and economic inequalities.  
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The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the flourishing of the new-
Schumpeterian literature is put in an historical context. In section 3, along with 
recognizing the great merits of “neo-Schumpeterism”, we highlight two key 
methodological and conceptual traits of this stream of literature which, to our view, make 
the latter unfit to deal with the potentially contradictory relationships between technology, 
economic development and social welfare in market economies, contradictions emerging 
especially in periods of prolonged structural crisis as the one we are living in. More in 
particular, the focus will be on the progressive shift of the bulk of “innovation studies” 
toward a micro-based and supply side view of the relationship between technology and 
economy (section 3). In section 4 it will be argued that such a “double shift” has 
contributed to favor a positivistic and a-critic representation of the economic and social 
effects of technology, marginalizing “classical” and “heterodox” topics such as the 
controversial relationships between technology and employment, technology and 
(economic) development, technology and the dynamic efficiency of markets.  
 
 
 
2. The emergence of neo-Schumpeterism as a new area of economic heterodoxy  
 
As well known over the last 150 years “economics” (political economy) as a scientific 
discipline has been largely dominated by the neoclassical school. This approach is 
characterized by a relatively high “internal” methodological and formal rigor. Its basic 
assumptions are however rather restrictive and depict a modus operandi of economic 
agents, markets and economic systems rather far from reality. Basic assumptions and 
restrictions are functional not only to preserve the internal methodological coherence of 
the model but also (and perhaps more importantly) to prove the virtues of markets and in 
particular the capacity of the “invisible hand” to guarantee an objectively “efficient” 
(Pareto optimal) and “fair” (one among the best possible) allocation of (limited) resources. 
In this respect it is enough to bear in mind that according to this approach competitive 
markets determine socially acceptable distribution outcomes, with income shares 
reflecting the objective and measurable contribution that each production factor provides 
to economic output. This in turn removes almost any ground for distributional tensions 
and conflicts; nor this approach is interested in analyzing the economic, institutional, 
   5 
social historical processes through which asymmetries in individual and social class 
endowments have been generated. In synthesis, the all theoretical and methodological 
neoclassical framework is designed in order to prove that market economies consist of 
harmonic, efficient and non-conflictual socio-economic systems. The functioning of 
market forces is in fact able to solve in the best way the unique “economic issue” 
individuals and society as a whole have to tackle: making the most efficient use of a 
scarce pool of resources (Robbins, 1932).  
 
In the standard neo-classical framework innovation and technological change are 
considered as exogenous variables, elements not essential for understanding the 
behaviours of economic agents, the functioning of markets, the aggregate performances of 
economic systems. Moving away from the “classical tradition”, the bulk of neoclassical 
theory has in fact focused on the static and equilibrium properties of markets assuming as 
exogenous (and external to the discipline) all the factors explaining “from within” the 
dynamism and qualitative changes of market economies, as well as its social structure 
(Schumpeter, 1912, 1942). As well known, over the last two decades, starting with the 
contribution of Lucas and Romer, there have been various attempts of endogenising 
innovation and technological change within formal neoclassical models of economic 
growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990, 1994; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998). However, the 
fundamental conceptual and methodological structure of these models has not 
significantly changed, remaining strongly anchored to methodological individualism, 
trusting the functioning of the Say law and the equilibrium properties of markets, 
assuming that the aggregate performances of markets and economic systems reflect  (and 
are the result of) the individual behaviors and choices of fully rational maximizing agents 
(Verspagen, 2005).  
 
In order to find an “endogenous”, socially and institutionally embedded treatment of 
technological change one has to look outside the orthodox field of economics, going back 
to the insightful (political economic) views of classical authors such as Smith and Ricardo 
(although in an embryonic form), looking at the titanic works of Marx and Schumpeter, at 
some important contributions in the post-Keynesian school (Kaldor, 1961;  Kalecki, 1954, 
1991) as well as at the heterodox area of institutional economics (Kapp. 1950; 1963). 
These schools and scholars, although being very heterogeneous as far as their theoretical 
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bases, methodological apparatus and research interests, share some very basic common 
heterodox traits the most important being: a) the acknowledgment of the intrinsic 
instability of capitalism conceived as a specific and historically determined socio-
economic system; b) an analytical focus on the factors, forces and conditions which alter 
economic equilibrium conditions; c) the idea that perfect competition is a rather abstract 
and irrelevant theoretical reference point, and a market structure which conflicts with both 
dynamic and static efficiency; d) the endogenous character of technological change a 
phenomenon and force strictly linked to the more general processes of capital 
accumulation, institutional, social and structural change. 
 
As already mentioned the neo-classical approach has been largely dominant in the last 150 
years. Keynesian theories, emerged after the great depression, have reached their 
maximum consensus in the few decades just before and after the second world war, 
loosing most of their appeal and political consensus in the 70s, in concomitance with the 
end of the post-war golden age of economic growth. Even more limited and residual has 
been the influence of Marxism. Interpreting the causes of the declining parabola of 
Keynesianism, as well as the misfortune of Marxism as a scientific discipline, would go 
much beyond the scope of this paper. It is nonetheless worth to remark that in all scientific 
disciplines, and especially in social sciences, the evolution and success of different 
schools and views are dependent not only on their “objective” explicative power but also 
(and perhaps in more stringent way) on the support they receive by the dominant 
ideological, economic and political establishment (Henry, 1990). This is even more true in 
the case of a scientific discipline such as “political economy”, given its strong and 
normative character, and its direct social and political implications. In the light of this, it is 
plausible to state that, much beyond its objective scientific values, the re-affirmation of 
the neoclassical apparatus is not independent from the change of the political and cultural 
climate we have been witnessing over the last three decades, with the widespread 
introduction of new-liberal policies and reforms, the increasing bargaining power of 
capital (vis à vis labour), especially in its dominating financial and transnational form 
(Bellofiore, 2013). 
 
It is in this sort of “neoclassical counter-reform climate” that Schumpeter has started to be 
re-discovered becoming a cultural heterodox reference point for a new field of research 
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specifically dealing with the “economics of technology and innovation”. The holistic 
methodological approach of the Austrian economist, his out-of-equilibrium, dynamic, 
historical view of economic processes, his interest on the role of innovation seen as the 
engine of competition, structural change and growth, have represented a strong source of 
attraction and inspiration for a new generation of economists and scholars. The 
acceleration of the rate of technological and scientific change, the paradigmatic change 
brought about the emergence and diffusion of ICTs have also contributed in the 70s and 
80s to the rapid growth of this new discipline variously labelled as “Economics of 
technological change”, “Economics of innovation”, “Schumpeterian economics”, 
“Evolutionary economics” (Dosi et al., 1988; Dogson and  Rothwell, 1994; Stoneman, 
1995; Fageberg et al., 2005; Hall and Rosenberg, 2010). For the sake of simplicity 
(and with a great deal of approximation) in this paper we label this rapidly growing 
research area, and related literature, as “neo-Schumpeterian”, focussing in particular on 
that branch dealing with the analysis, determinant and effects of technological change and 
innovation (Winter, 2014).  
 
 
3. Merits and shortcomings of the neo-Schumpeterism 
 
There is no doubt that the neo-Schumpeterian literature has had the fundamental merit of 
bringing back (after Marx and Schumpeter) technology and innovation at the centre of 
economic theory and analysis. This stream of literature has in fact filled an important gap 
in economic theory, providing for the first time a systematic array of analyses, theories 
and evidences on a complex and multiform phenomena such as technological change and 
innovation. This line of research has been opened up in the 70s by the pioneering 
contributions of Christopher Freeman, Nathan Rosenberg, Richard Nelson and Sidney 
Winter, followed by other influential scholars on both sides of the Atlantic ocean, and by 
the setting-up of think-thank research institutes such as the Science Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU) in the UK, the Maastricht Economic Research on Innovation and Technology 
(MERIT) in The Netherlands (Fageberg and Verspagen, 2009; Fageberg et al., 2012). 
 
Over the last few decades this research area has expanded at an exponential rate 
consolidating itself as a new autonomous discipline around a visible and highly 
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interconnected college of scholars, grown-up outside or the very margin of mainstream 
economic departments (Fageberg and Verspagen, 2009). The research topics investigated 
have also progressively expanded. In extreme synthesis the scholars active in this new 
field of research have devoted their efforts mainly at: a) exploring the “black box” of 
technology, investigating sources, procedures, purposes of innovation activities; b) 
collecting data on science, technology and innovation and identifying appropriate 
indicators to be used for empirical research and policy purposes; c) investigating the 
effects technology and innovation exert on the key economic performance variables at any 
possible level of aggregation; d) drawing from all these theoretical contributions 
evidences and stylized facts, hints and lessons for policy action (Fageberg, 2013b).  
 
The neo-Schumpeterian literature resumes from Schumpeter the idea that technology and 
innovation (along with diffusion) are the distinctive and most important drivers of 
competition, the real fuel of the process of economic change, that is the birth(death) of 
firms, the emergence(decline) of markets and industries as well as the dynamic 
performance of economies at large. However, the “evolutionary metaphor” synthesised by 
the Schumpeterian “process of creative destruction” has been conceptualized and analyzed 
in very different ways and namely: at different levels of the analysis (micro, meso, 
macro); within different time scale frameworks (short versus long-term processes of 
structural change); looking at different type of actors and institutions (entrepreneurs, 
firms, industries, national innovation systems). This clearly emerges looking at the tables 
of contents of the main handbooks of technological change and innovation published over 
the last three decades (Dosi et al., 1988; Dogson and  Rothwell, 1994; Stoneman, 1995; 
Fageberg et al., 2005; Hall and Rosenberg, 2010) as well as by recent reviews of the state 
of art of the evolutionary literature (Fageberg et al., 2012; Fageberg, 2013a; Dosi, 2013; 
Winter, 2014).  
 
An important point we want to make in this paper has to do with the specific long-term 
trajectory shown by the innovation studies over the last 30 years, highlighting some 
important differences between the works and perspectives of early neo-Schumpeterian 
contributions and the most recent stream of innovation studies; a trajectory that has also 
marked an increasing distance of recent neo-Schumpeterian literature with the ways 
previous heterodox schools used to look at the role of technology in the economy and 
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society. It is precisely with reference to the characterizing features of the neo-
Schumpeterian literature in the last two decades that we want now turn our attention, 
highlighting three (interdependent) broad trends in this research stream:     
 
a) the first trend consists of having progressively shifted the focus of the analysis of the 
technology-economy relationships from a macro to a micro-economic level;  
b) the second trend is a progressive reinforcement of a supply-side view of  the 
relationships between the generation, diffusion and use of technology and the main 
economic phenomena, with the role of demand largely neglected;  
c) the third element (in our opinion, logical consequence of the previous two points) is 
the emergence of an (implicit) positivistic view of the economic and social role 
technology plays in market economies.  
 
 
4. Towards a supply-side and micro-founded view of technology 
 
There is no doubt that when compared to the views of classical economists and even more 
to the post-Keynesian tradition, the neo-Schumpeterian literature looks at the relationships 
between technology and economy from a somewhat different perspective. The main 
differences have to do with the level of aggregation of the analysis, the level of 
generalization of the relationships examined, the relative importance given respectively to 
demand and supply-side drivers of growth. In fact, since its origin, the neo-Schumpeterian 
literature has shown little interest in the traditional macro-economic variables and 
dynamic mechanisms taken into account in the post-Keynesian tradition, with the latter 
revolving around the dynamic interplay between investment, capital accumulation, 
productivity growth, income distribution and effective demand. It is however in the last 
two decades that the emphasis has clearly shifted towards a fully supply-side view of the 
dynamics of macroeconomic forces with a key role played by intangible investments 
(Evangelista, 1999), and with technology seen as the ultimate source of all sort of 
economic performances variables, and in particular the factor explaining the observed 
cross-country disparities in productivity growth and international competitiveness. In 
particular, the role of demand, and its relationship with rate and direction of technological 
change, has been largely neglected. In fact, in most of the theoretical and empirical neo-
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Schumpeterian literature economic growth (associated to the process of creative 
destruction) is never constrained by aggregate demand, and the latter is automatically 
expanded by technology through the emergence of new markets, new industries and 
products.
1
 In the evolutionary literature the technology-economy relationships become 
highly dependent on contextual conditions. It is in fact the idiosyncratic nature of 
knowledge accumulation and innovation processes that explains why economies, as well 
as regions, industries and firms, differ from each other in their technological capabilities 
and economic performances. As a result, the “growth issue” has been progressively 
reduced to a “competitiveness matter” based on “absolute competitive advantages” with 
both gross domestic product (GDP) and employment growth depending on the country-
specific capabilities of economies, industries and firms to increase their market shares 
within the broader process of creative destruction.
2
  
 
In this supply-side (competitive-based) view of the technology-economy relationships the 
micro-level mechanisms governing the fabric of innovation processes have become a key 
area of investigation and theoretical concern. This explains why the analytical and 
empirical focus of innovation studies has progressively shifted from a macro to a micro 
level.
3 
The exploration of the sources, procedures and effects of innovation at a micro and 
industry level has been considered of crucial importance, in order to qualify the specific 
behaviors and mechanisms governing the processes of variety generation and market 
selection, to find proper micro-economic theoretical foundations (and empirical support) 
to the evolutionary models of competition, economic growth and industrial dynamics 
(Dosi, 1988; Dosi and Nelson, 2010).
4
 
 
                                                 
1
 Among the few exceptions see Dosi et al., 2010.  
2
 The literature on National systems of innovation, emphasizing the role of institutions represents in this 
respect a notable exception (Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008; Soete et al., 2010) 
3
 The micro-economic shift of innovation studies is clearly visible looking at the index of the main handbooks 
of the technological change and innovation published over the last two decades where the macro-economic 
analyses of the determinants and effects of technological change, especially in a long run perspective, find 
only a limited space (Dogson and  Rothwell, 1994; Stoneman, 1995; Fageberg et al., 2005; Hall and 
Rosenberg, 2010).  
4
 There is no need to say that the “microeconomic foundations” of evolutionary economics are antithetic to 
the neoclassical ones. In particular, the evolutionary school rejects most of original micro-economic 
neoclassical assumptions such as the idea of representative agents, the presence of full rationality of 
economic behaviors, the public nature of technology as well as the assimilation of technology to pure 
information (Dosi, 1988). 
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The heterogeneous nature of innovation and its role in fueling economic change has in 
fact become the main core of neo-Schumpeterian studies (Evangelista and Mastrostefano, 
2006). The areas explored by this literature is very large and the contribution provided by 
these new research stream to our understanding of innovation, firms‟ behaviors and 
industrial dynamics can hardly be underestimated (Dosi, 2013; Winter, 2014). However, 
an argument can definitely be made on the fact that the supply-side perspective and the 
micro-economic focus adopted by the bulk of these studies have also contributed to the 
rising of a deterministic and positivistic vision of the role technology plays in the 
economy and society, with innovation playing a sort of thaumaturgic role, being able to 
explain almost everything: the performance of firms, industries, regions and countries as 
well as the destiny of individuals and workers.
5
 This almost un-conditionally positive and 
socially progressive role played by technology in our economies and societies is in turn 
based on two basic assumptions: 
  
a) the first one is the existence of a strong pervasive (Schumpeterian) nexus between 
technology, growth and employment with the positive economic effect of technology 
being inseparably linked to the capacity of firms, industries and economies of 
winning the competitive race relying upon their superior technological capabilities; 
b) the second (often implicit) one, is that technological competition consists always of a 
positive economic and social sum game, and that this has been true in the past, holds 
in the present times and will continue to be true also for the future, and this 
independently from the macro-economic conditions in which the process of creative 
destruction takes place, the specific techno-economic regime, the broad social and 
institutional context in which technological competition takes place.  
 
An important point we want to make is that the combination of these two assumptions has 
contributed to convey a rather simplified picture of the social and economic perspectives 
linked to the advancements of technologies and their socio-economic use in the context of 
market economies, that is in an institutional context in which the decision processes 
regarding the rate, direction and use of technology are largely dominated by un-
                                                 
5
 This has also favoured a sort of techno-centrism and an auto-referential character of this discipline. As 
indicated by Bart Verspagen “…evolutionary economics so far by and large lacks a clear theory of other 
economic phenomena than technological change, e.g., the interaction between trade and growth, or the theory 
of labour or financial markets” (Verspagen, 2002. p.3). 
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coordinated profit-seeking behaviors and incentives and asymmetric economic power, the 
dominating logic of financial markets. Furthermore, while the first assumption is based on 
sound theoretical and empirical bases, as far the second assumption is concerned one finds 
very few theoretical arguments and limited empirical support. The opinion of the author of 
this contribution is that this analytical deficit and simplification of the macro-economic 
nature of the determinants and effects of technological change is largely the result of an 
unduly transposition at a macroeconomic level of relationships and mechanisms holding at 
a microeconomic level. As a provocation, one could argue that most of the neo-
Schumpeterian literature somehow conveys a sort of Schumpeterian version of the neo-
classical Say law which could be re-phrased as follows:  “each technology creates its own 
demand”, and this is deemed to be true at a micro as well as at a macro level. In fact, 
macro-economic demand conditions necessary to absorb the increased levels of output or 
new types of productive outputs are usually not taken into account or incorporated in the 
analysis. More specifically, this type of approach neglects or underplays crucial macro-
economic issues addressed in the heterodox field of economics (especially in Marx‟s 
writings and in the post-Keynesian tradition) and concerning the possible mismatch, 
between interrelated phenomena such as dynamics of investment and technology, the 
corresponding changes in supply forces (productivity), changes in income distribution and 
demand conditions (Courvisanos, 2012). These mismatches are at the basis of possible or 
potential phenomena of over-capacity, under-consumption, misallocation and waste of 
resources (human, tangible and intangible), static and dynamic efficiency losses, all 
aspects largely neglected in the neo-Schumpeterian literature. 
 
 
4. Heterodox themes marginalized in the neo-Schumpeterian research agenda 
 
The methodological and theoretical traits of the neo-Schumpeterian literature highlighted 
in the previous section have led to the marginalization of broad macroeconomic and 
socially relevant themes concerning the role and socio-economic impact of technological 
change. In what follows we list four of such neglected themes in a rather sketched and un-
systematic fashion, as they are merely exemplificative of the change of perspective of this 
stream of literature when compared to the other major heterodox schools both in the 
classical tradition as well as in the post-Keynesian one. 
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Technology and employment. This is a topic and a social issue placed at the center of 
theorizing since the beginning of the political economy discipline. Surprisingly enough, 
after the pioneering contributions of early neo-Schumpeterian scholars such as Freeman, 
Clark and Soete (Freeman et al., 1982; Freeman and Soete, 1994) this theme has been 
progressively marginalized in the following neo-Schumpeterian literature.
6
 The main 
reason of this disinterest is an (implicit) belief that technology is potentially able to foster 
economic growth at a pace sufficient to warranty full employment. Of course the 
existence of labour displacing effects is not ruled out but for most of the existing literature 
(both mean-stream and neo-Schumpeterian) this phenomenon affects low skilled jobs 
while the overall impact is thought to be positive. However, there is no empirical evidence 
supporting this optimistic view given the difficulty of modelling and estimating the net 
long term aggregate effect of technological change on employment (Vivarelli 2013). The 
functioning and strength of the so-called compensation mechanisms (Vivarelli, 1995; 
Vivarelli and Pianta, 2000) crucially depends on rather axiomatic conditions such as the 
existence of perfect competitive markets, a perfect and continuous inputs‟ substitutability, 
the validity of the so-called Say‟s law which guarantees that changes in „supply 
conditions‟ (i.e. productivity growth and supply of new products) always generate 
corresponding (market clearing) changes in demand. The net aggregate employment 
impact of technological change becomes even more difficult to be assessed in the case of 
the diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). This is because of 
the pervasiveness of these technologies and their widespread impact on almost any 
domain of our economic and social life (Evangelista et al., 2014). In the light of all this, 
the still dominant optimistic and supply-side view of the relationship between 
technological change and employment, as well as the little attention given to this crucial 
and socially relevant theme by neo-Schumpeterian Scholar is somehow surprising. 
 
Technology and socio-economic progress. The intertwined relationships between 
technological change and the long term transformation of economic and social conditions 
(socio-economic progress) is another broad theme present in the research agenda of early 
evolutionary economics, but marginalized in the recent neo-Schumpeterian literature. In 
fact, despite this topic has been dealt with by some of the pioneers of the neo-
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Schumpeterian school such as Christopher Freeman and Carlota Perez, in the last two 
decades it has been progressively expelled from the research agenda of innovation studies. 
The effects of technology on the economy and society have in fact been investigated more 
and more in a linear, deterministic and quantitative way, shifting the focus from the 
technology-development issue, to a mere quantification (econometric estimation) of the 
effects of technology on GDP and productivity growth or on international 
competitiveness. This technology based perspective of economic growth and socio-
economic progress reveals increasing difficulties to interpret what might be regarded as 
one of the major macro-economic paradox materialized over the last decades: the 
mismatch between on the one hand the incredibly large opportunities offered by 
technology achievements and, on the other hand, the increase of economic and social 
inequalities, the large amount of un-satisfied social and human needs, the un-sustainable 
pressure that our economic model put on natural resources and the natural environment 
(Pagano and Rossi, 2011). Technology interpreted in the neo-Schumpeterian literature as 
the key driver of growth (and social progress) has determined macroeconomic and (more 
broadly) social outcomes much below the expectations (Gordon, 2012). In the last three 
decades the world economy has grown at pace which is almost half of the one experienced 
in the first two second post-war decades and this despite we have witnessed what has been 
labelled as the third industrial and technological revolution, that is the one connected to 
the widespread diffusion of ICT in almost any domain of our economies and societies. An 
interpretation given to this paradox by neo-Schumpeterian scholars such as Freeman and 
Perez (Freeman and Perez, 1988; Freeman and Louça, 2001) has consisted in 
highlighting the inertia and the limited capacity of the broader socio-institutional system 
(skills, education system, institutions, labour practices and organizations) to keep-up with 
the paradigmatic nature of the ICT revolution (the mismatch hypothesis). The same type 
of argument is put forward by Paul David in connection to the “general  purpose” nature 
of ICT (GPT) (David, 1991; David and Wrights; 1999; Bresnahan, 2010). Using David 
and Wrights words  “…an extended phase of transition may be required to fully 
accommodate and hence elaborate a technological and organizational regime built around 
a general purpose digital computing engine” (David and Wrights, 1999, p. 16). There is no 
doubt that these are rather powerful arguments highlighting the presence of socio-
economic and institutional inertial factors characterizing transition phases between 
                                                                                                                                                             
66
 The works of Vivarelli and Pianta represent in this respect relevant exceptions  (Vivarelli, 1995; Vivarelli 
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different techno-economic paradigms and GPT. However, this line of argument is 
progressively losing its explicative power and plausibility taking into account the 
considerable time past since ICT have first appeared and the pervasive role nowadays they 
play in our economies and societies.  
 
 
Technology and income distribution. This is another theme central among Classical 
economists, an issue somewhat dealt with by post-Keynesian scholars and somehow 
surprisingly expelled by the Neo-Schumpeterian research agenda. In the perspective of 
Classical economists as well as in the views of Kalecki the rate and direction of 
technological change are heavily influenced by the social and economic relationships 
shaping the structure and functioning of capitalism (Courvisanos, 2009, 2012). In 
particular for Marx and Kalecki within capitalist economies technological change has an 
ultimate (overall and long-term) capital deepening and labour-saving nature, and this has 
obvious implications in terms of income distribution, and consequently on the 
composition and volume of aggregate demand. The cyclical occurrence of phases of over-
production, unemployment, under consumption, skewed income distribution and 
insufficient demand are strictly inter-connected phenomena associated to the very nature 
of capital accumulation, inter-capital competition and the non-coordinated nature of 
investment decision. In this perspective technological change simply amplifies the 
contradictory nature of this process fuelling the divergence between the development of 
production forces (labor productivity), distribution relationships and the capacity of 
market (in particular final demand) to absorb all production output. Both Marx and Kaleki 
makes clear this point by stressing the structural asymmetry between capital accumulation 
and demand with the latter constrained by an insufficient dynamics of wages (Sebastiani, 
1989). For both of them this asymmetry is at the core of the contradictory and cyclical 
nature of capitalist development. According to Marx “…the more productivity develops, 
the more it comes into conflict with the narrow basis on which the relations of 
consumption rests” (Marx, 1981, p. 353). Kalecki expresses a similar point stating that the 
most remarkable paradox of the capitalist system has to do with the fact that “…the 
expansion of the capital equipment. i.e., the increase in the national wealth, contains the 
seed of depression in the course of which the additional wealth proves to be only potential 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Pianta, 2000; Pianta, 2005).   
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in character” (Kalecki, 1935, p. 32). Despite some of these views might be criticized as 
encompassing a certain degree of socio-economic determinism there is no doubt that they 
highlight an important issue and namely the one concerning the role that capitalist social 
relationships play in shaping the rate and direction of technological change as well as it 
economic impact.  
 
In the most recent neo-Schumpeterian the role that technology and innovation play within 
a socio-economic context characterized by potentially conflictual capital-labour 
relationships is clearly underplayed, as well as there is little concern on the specific 
influence that such institutional setting can exert on the “distribution outcome” of 
technological change (Smith 2010). In the neo-Schumpeterian literature technological 
change ceases to have a dominant labour saving nature. The process of creative 
destruction is in fact conceived as associated first of all to the rise and expansion of new 
products and industries. It is somehow implicit in this literature the idea that productivity 
gains obtained via technological change are so large and widespread that “income 
distribution” becomes a marginal issue or an issue which has little to do with the rate and 
direction of technological change. As already pointed out, the distributional effects of 
technological change have been mainly associated to the skill-biased nature of innovation, 
with the latter leading to an increasing income polarization between skilled and unskilled 
workers. A key issue which has not been investigated by both main-stream and Neo-
Schumpeterian literature is the extent to which the long term changes in income 
distribution from labor to capital observed in most industrialized countries is associated 
(along with the dominant role played by financial capitaò) to the nature of the new 
technological regime or the way ICTs are used in both manufacturing and service 
industries, as well as within society at large. Despite the great emphasis of innovation 
literature on intangible investments and human capital existing statistics show that the 
capital to labour ratio keeps increasing both in manufacturing and service industries and 
both in OECD as well as in emerging economies (Basu and Vasudevan, 2013). As already 
mentioned these trends and processes have clear implications on income distribution and 
aggregate demand, connections and implications not investigated by the neo-
Schumpeterian literature.  
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Technology and the dynamic efficiency of markets. As already anticipated a common trait 
of most heterodox economic schools consists of acknowledging the intrinsic instability of 
capitalism and that the un-constrained and un-regulated functioning of markets is far from 
guarantying full employment, a path of steady growth and a socially acceptable allocation 
of resources. Despite the “market failure” concept has been first introduced and 
theoretically treated by neoclassical economists – also with reference to the public good 
nature of knowledge and innovation (Arrow, 1962) - its relevance has been clearly 
downplayed within mainstream economics being considered an exceptional case and 
having only a micro-economic nature. Evolutionary theories have partly corrected the 
mainstream view of technology and innovation assimilated to pure public goods, 
emphasising the tacit component and the sticky nature of most technological knowledge 
developed and used by firms (Metcalfe, 1995). Evolutionary scholars have further 
enriched the analysis on the factors enhancing or impeding innovation shifting the focus 
on other types of “failures” namely those referring to the structure and functioning of 
innovation systems, that is to the mechanisms facilitating or hampering the complex and 
cumulative nature of innovation and learning processes as well as the circulation and 
sharing of knowledge and the connectivity between firms and institutions (Lundvall and 
Borras, 2005). This has represented a substantial advancement that has opened up a new 
perspective on the role and scope of science and technology policies (Smith, 2000; 
Chaminade and Edquist 2006). However almost ignored in the current evolutionary 
literature is the very basic issue concerning the extent to which, and the conditions under 
which, the modus operandi of market economies, and in particular an institutional context 
characterized by un-coordinated investment decisions, strong technological rivalry, and 
the dominance of a profit seeking rationale - are able to assure long-term dynamic 
efficiency and a path of socially desirable, labour and environment friendly technological 
development (Frigato and Santos-Artega, 2012). Addressing this type of issue would 
imply to further enlarging the concept of “systemic failure” adopting an historical and 
macro-institutional view of the structure, modus operandi and “social performance” of 
capitalist economies and on the role technological change plays in this institutional 
context. This is the perspective one can find once again in both Marxian and Kalecki 
writings, in Schumpeter‟s late work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, as well as in  
the works of heterodox institutional scholars grown up in the Veblen-Kapp tradition 
(Ramazzotti et al., 2012). Most of the current debate within and outside main-stream 
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economics is on the contrary a-critically squeezed on a positivistic view on the economic 
and socially progressive role that technology plays in our economies and societies (Soete, 
2013) and on the widespread belief that profit-seeking private incentives and free 
worldwide competition represent the best institutional framework in which technologies 
can be developed and used for social purposes. More specifically, there seem to be little 
concern, and empirical analysis, on the “net world-wide effect” of the current process of 
creative-destruction, especially and weather in periods of prolonged economic crises and 
stagnant demand destruction is prevailing upon creative accumulation (Archibugi and 
Filippetti, 2011a, 2011b). Similarly, there seem to be little theoretical concern and 
investigation of the long-term effects produced by the changes taking place in most 
industrialized countries in the structure, funding and orientation of science and technology 
systems as a result of the overwhelming share of total R&D activities carried out by 
private corporations, the processes of privatization and liberalization of sectors 
characterized by dynamic efficiency and strong externalities, the pro-market orientation of 
public research, the short-term rational dominating financial markets, managerial 
strategies and investment activities (Mazzuccato, 2013). 
 
 
6.  Final remarks 
 
In this contribution we have highlighted the dominant positivistic view of the relationship 
between technology, economy and society permeating not only mainstream economics but 
also a good deal of the most recent neo-Schumpeterian literature. This positivistic view 
clashes against one of the main paradox of our times that is the sharp contrast between the 
acceleration of the rate of scientific and technological change experienced over the last 
decades and the limited capabilities shown by our socio-economic systems to exploit them 
in order to answer human needs and secure a path of sustainable development. This 
paradox emerges even more sharply taking into account the prophecy of John Maynard 
Keynes in his famous speech on the “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” 
(1930). In this speech Keynes explicitly forecasted that - thanks to the opportunities 
offered by technological change within around one hundred years‟ time “…for the first 
time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem: how to use 
his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and 
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compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well” (Keynes, 
1963). As poignantly stated by Giorgio Lunghini in the eighty years past since Keynes 
speech human kind has not significantly moved in that direction as the combination of 
high rates of unemployment and the presence of a large amount of unsatisfied needs 
demonstrates, and this despite the fact that the technological premises to give an answer to 
these needs exist (Lunghini, 2012). 
 
There seems to be little doubt that explaining this paradox, understanding its deep 
economic, social and institutional bases, would require to acknowledge first and foremost 
the complex, non linear and potentially contradictory nature of the relationships between 
technological progress, economic growth and human-social development, especially in the 
context of un-coordinated market-based economies, and especially in the current global, 
un-regulated financial capitalism. This was the perspective adopted by heterodox thinkers 
such as Marx and Kalecki, a perspective abandoned by the neoclassical school and 
marginalized by most of the heterodox economic schools of the 20th century.  
 
The main (provocative) argument put forward in this paper is that the recent neo-
Schumpeterian literature has further contributed to reinforce a deterministic (one-way) and 
supply side reading of the relationship between technology, economy and society, with 
technology being able to guaranty strong economic (GDP) growth and (implicitly) social 
welfare. This is confirmed by the fact that, contrary to classical economists, and 
Schumpeter himself, in the recent neo-Schumpeterian literature (especially in the 
evolutionary stream) technology is only rarely associated to macroeconomic market 
failures such as systemic crises, structural unemployment, and the growth of social and 
economic inequalities. It has been argued that this is in turn due to two major traits of this 
literature and namely the adoption a fully supply side and micro economic view of the 
technology-economy relationships. 
  
This approach has become dominant also in the policy debate. The latter is often 
characterized by the reiteration of repetitive refrains on the importance of technology, the 
need of enhancing the technological potential of firms, industries, countries, the need of 
orientating public research to the needs and requests of the private business sector. 
Technology is also seen as one of the key recipe to tackle the current economic crisis, the 
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lack of growth, and the high unemployment rates most European countries are 
experiencing. Underlying this supply-side view of the role technology plays in the 
economy there is an unlimited faith in the economic and socially progressive nature of the 
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction driven by market forces, as well as the idea 
that the economic problems of any country, region or industry, can by magic be solved 
through a “technological jump”.  
 
The positivistic shift of the literature dealing with the economic effects of technology and 
innovation finds a parallel in the expulsion from the current research agenda of broad and 
socially relevant themes on which old heterodox schools were used to debate and confront 
each other such as the relationship between technology and development, the complex 
interactions between technological change, employment, income distribution and demand. 
These themes have been traditionally ignored by mainstream economics but also too 
quickly expelled from the neo-Schumpeterian theoretical agenda. This has contributed to 
impoverish the theoretical debate, determining a diminished capacity to explore the 
complex and non-linear relationships between technological progress, economic change 
and societal development. The final message of this paper is that it would be now very 
important and useful to go back to these themes and approaches, re-interpret them with the 
lenses of our times, in particular taking into account the new economic and societal and 
environmental challenges that the structure and modus operandi of contemporary 
capitalism rises. This would require to re-open the ground for an open-mind cultural 
debate on the long-term options regarding the social and institutional mechanisms 
governing the pace and direction of technological change, going much beyond the 
boundaries of traditional (micro-level) market-failures or on the “systemic failure” taken 
into account by the neo-Schumpeterian literature. On a more operational ground, there is 
the urgency of re-framing the analysis of the technology-economic relationships in a 
proper macro-economic and institutional framework in which the dynamic interaction 
between changes in technology, income distribution and demand is put at the centre of the 
theoretical and empirical agenda. 
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